Wikileaks: PM Siniora and the July War

SUBJECT:�LEBANESE PM SINIORA: "WE NEED HELP." id: 71234date: 7/13/2006 11:01refid: 06BEIRUT2353origin: Embassy Beirutclassification: SECRETdestination:header:VZCZCXRO7673OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUKDE RUEHLB #2353/01 1941101ZNY SSSSS ZZHO 131101Z JUL 06FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUTTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4578INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATERUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATERHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATERHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATERHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE----------------- header ends ----------------S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002353 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2016TAGS: IS, IZ, LE, PGOV, PTER, SYSUBJECT: MGLE01: LEBANESE PM SINIORA: "WE NEED HELP." Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Resaon: Sections 1.4 (b ) and (d) SUMMARY ------- 1. (S) Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora expressed deep concern to the Ambassador this morning that the current security crisis is unfolding "as if by script," with Israel and Hizballah dutifully playing out the assigned roles one would expect in a worst case scenario path to regional war.He argued that the only possible way to salvage the situation will be for the GOL to "change the script" by dissociating the GOL from Hizballah's actions, asserting the Lebanese government's responsibility for security in the south, maintaining peace along the Blue Line, respecting all relevant international resolutions, and soliciting United Nations support to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the current crisis. Siniora also criticized Israel's military response over the past 24 hours as "disproportionate" and "unhelpful," and he requested USG and international assistance in asking the Israelis to scale back theirmilitary assault and lift the air and sea blockade of Lebanon. Siniora argued that Israel's response plays into the hands of Hizballah and Damascus and is paving the way for a Syrian re-occupation of Lebanon. Siniora and the Ambassador discussed international diplomatic initiatives to resolve the crisis, including a German offer to serve as an intermediary between Lebanon and Israel. Siniora also said that a Presidential statement from the UNSC would be beneficial -- even if critical of Lebanon -- and couldexplore the possibility of using UNIFIL renewal as a tool to reassert control in the south. The mood in the Grand Serail was grim today, and as the meeting was breaking up, Siniora leaned close to the Ambassador and flatly whispered, "We needhelp." End Summary. CONCERNED BY RAPID ESCALATION, SINIORA SUGGESTS A STRONG GOL RESPONSE-------------------------------------- 2. (C) On the morning of July 13, the Ambassador and emboff called on Prime Minister Siniora at the Grand Serail. The British Ambassador to Lebanon, James Watt, was present in the meeting as well. As the Prime Minister sat down, he complained that Israel's strong military response has been counterproductive and is uniting the Lebanese people behind Hizballah. He then said he is planning a strong government response of his own however, and had scheduled a Council of Ministers meeting for that afternoon. In it, he said he would push for a strong statement "dissociating" the GOL fromHizballah's actions. Siniora also told the Ambassador that the only way to "change the script" and take the initiative away from Hizballah is to push for a unified GOL position asserting the government's sole authority for security in south Lebanon, calling for a cease-fire along the Blue Line, respecting all relevant international resolutions, and soliciting United Nations support to negotiate an immediate,mutual cease-fire with Israel. The Ambassador asked the Prime Minister if he had publicly made such a statement yet. Siniora replied, "No, but I will." He added that he had made a statement last night dissociating the government from Hizballah's actions, but recognized that in the face of the significant escalation from both sides that took place this morning, he would need to take a stronger, more comprehensive position. 3. (C) Siniora then returned again to the topic of Israel's punishing military response this morning, and complained that they were making the situation worse with "disproportionate" actions that were uniting Arab opinion behind Hizballah and against Israel. "They are crippling our economy, killing ourpeople, they are going to take us back twenty years. This does not help." In response. the Ambassador suggested that it would be important for the GOL to credibly distance itself from Hizballah's assaults if they hoped to temper the severity of Israel's retaliation. A HIZBALLAH PROXY FOR THE SYRIAN-IRANIAN ENDGAME------------------------- 4. (C) The Prime Minister acknowledged as much, but said he was concerned about Syria and Iran as well. The Prime Minister's chief of staff, Ambassador Mohammad Chattah, said that Hizballah's recent campaign was obviously conducted for the benefit of Syria and Iran, "They want to distract attention from the UNIIIC investigations and the nuclear issue. That's the only explanation for why Hizballah would do this after they've been assuring us they would be quiet." The Prime Minister took it one step further, adding, 'They knew what the result of this would be. They saw Gaza, they knew how the Israelis would react. This isn't about trading prisoners at all, even if that is the declared objective."The Ambassador asked, in that case, what the Prime Minister thought the Iranian - Syrian endgame is. Siniora sighed, "They want to break our government and delay the tribunal," acknowledging that after crippling the Lebanese government, Syria would then re-invade to "save" Lebanon from Israel. Headded that Iran also wants to open a front on Israel's northern border to distract from the mounting tensions regarding its own nuclear program. ATTEMPTS AT RESOLUTION---------------------- 5. (C) Siniora thanked the Ambassador for the Secretary's remarks yesterday, and said that he had also talked twice to United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan. He said that Annan was considering sending an envoy to Lebanon to help mediate the crisis. Siniora said he would prefer "someonewho understands the region," suggesting Terje Roed Larsen, although he was aware that Annan is considering two other candidates first. Siniora also said that he talked to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and the Saudi government yesterday as well, adding that Prince Saud gave strong support by telling Siniora that they should not allow "any organization (e.g. Hizballah) to undermine sovereign national Arab security." 6. (S) Siniora also revealed an offer he said he had received from Germany yesterday to serve as an intermediary in negotiations between Lebanon and Israel. UK Ambassador Watt said he thought it was a good idea, and that if the Israelis were receptive, it would serve as useful and discreet back channel. But, the UK Ambassador said, it is far from clear that the Israelis are in any mood for such an initiative. The Ambassador underscored the point, expressing reservations. The Prime Minister's special assistant, RolaNoureddine, pointed out that they would have to be careful in setting up the back channel so that it doesn't look like they are trying to negotiate a prisoner release, which would be interpreted as a victory for Hizballah, or at least a GOL endorsement of Hizballah's plan. 7. (C) Mohammad Chattah raised the possibility of a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) on the situation. Ambassador Watt noted that any UNSCR would inevitably include a condemnation Hizballah's actions as well. Prime Minister Siniora responded by saying that at this point, a supportive statement from the UNSC Presidency would be better than a UNSCR. Siniora suggested that with UNIFIL renewal on the table, perhaps the UNSC President could look at UNIFIL renewal as a tool to reassert control in south Lebanon. Even if the UNSC presidency statement would contain sharp criticisms of Lebanon as well as calling for Israeli restraint, Siniora said, he still thought action in New York would be helpful. HELP ON BLOCKADE---------------- 8. (C) Soon after the Ambassador left the meeting, Siniora called by phone to say that he had forgotten to mention a key point. Israel's announced air and sea blockade of Lebanon, he said, was "pushing us all into the arms of Syria." "Syria is becoming our lungs," he said; "we can only breathe through the Syrians." He urged that the U.S. press the Israelis to lift or at least lighten the blockade. He also passed on one specific request: the Lebanese want to get six empty jets (five belonging to MEA and a sixth) out of Beirut and to Larnaca. Siniora expressed hope that the U.S. could at leastget the Israelis to allow the airport to function for 60-90 minutes to evacuate the planes. (Siniora claimed that the runways could be temporarily patched quickly, in order to allow the departure of the planes.) FELTMAN =======================CABLE ENDS============================SUBJECT:�INCENSED BY ISRAELI TARGETING OF LAF,FRENCH AMBASSADOR WORRIES THAT ENEMIES OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY WILL SPLIT FRANCE AND UNITED STATESid: 71778date: 7/18/2006 16:26refid: 06BEIRUT2413origin: Embassy Beirutclassification: SECRET//NOFORNdestination:header:VZCZCXRO2317OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUKDE RUEHLB #2413/01 1991626ZNY SSSSS ZZHO 181626Z JUL 06FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUTTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4687INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATERUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVERUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVERUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0646RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL----------------- header ends ----------------S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002413 SIPDIS NOFORNSIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2016TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PTER, ASEC, CASC, LE, FRSUBJECT: TFLE01: INCENSED BY ISRAELI TARGETING OF LAF,FRENCH AMBASSADOR WORRIES THAT ENEMIES OF LEBANESESOVEREIGNTY WILL SPLIT FRANCE AND UNITED STATES BEIRUT 00002413 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY------- 1. (S/NF) While acknowledging that there was something not quite right abotu the activities at the Jamhour military� base, French Ambassador Emie described recent Israeli strikes on Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) facilities as "unbelievable." If the Israeli campaign was going to continue along these lines, it was all the more reason to evacuate French nationals from Lebanon, he said. While the "March 14" coalition appears to have pinned its hopes on the Israelis clipping Hizballah's wings, Emie doubted that this campaign could do it. He expressed foreboding of Hizballah raising its prestige further with more rocket attacks on Israel, while the enemies of Lebanese sovereignty managed to split the United States and France in the UN Security Council. He predicted that, unless the UNSC could react to the growing crisis soon, France would "take its own initiatives" in the Council, which even Emie admitted would be a victory for Hizballah and Syria. End summary. DESTROY THE ARMY, DESTROY THE STATE----------------------------------- 2. (S/NF) In a brief call that the Ambassador made on French Ambassador Bernard Emie on the afternoon of July 18, Emie described that morning's Israeli attack on an LAF engineering unit in Jamhour (near the Defense Ministry) as "unbelievable." Israel needed to be told clearly that "if you destroy the army, you destroy the state," he said. "Do they want to give the country to Iran, Syria, Hizballah?" Emie expressed deep concern that the LAF, which had for the most part not responded to Israeli attacks, would be encouraged to side with Hizballah. 3. (S/NF) Emie said he had spoken earlier that day with a "shocked" LAF commander, General Michel Suleiman. Suleiman, who was "shaken but very reasonable," had told Emie that the LAF would not fire any shots in anger unless it was attacked again. The Ambassador told Emie that there was some information that the personnel or unit in question had questionable activities and might have facilitated Hizballah attacks. Emie agreed there was "something fishy" about Jamhour, but he nevertheless thought that the risks to Lebanon were too great for additional attacks against the LAF. EVACUATION CONCERNS------------------- 4. (S/NF) If� the Israeli air campaign continued along the same lines as seen earlier today, Emie continued, there was all the more reason to evacuate from Lebanon, and fast. He was "very worried" about the security environment for large-scale evacuations if more Israeli strikes on civilians, infrastructure, and the LAF took place. "They will shoot at us," he said. 5. (S/NF) Emie agreed with the Ambassador that an immediate cease-fire would leave Hizballah as the winner. This would be "a disaster," he said, but it would at least give the Lebanese people a breathing space. While the "March 14" coalition led by Saad Hariri appears to want Israel to "do the dirty work" when it comes to disarming Hizballah, the Israeli campaign, should it continue along the same lines, would not succeed in doing so. At the same time, Hizballah's ability to bombard Israel with its own rockets only raised its prestige further. The future was frightening, Emie said. DANGER OF U.S.-FRENCH SPLIT ON UNSC----------------------------------- 6. (S/NF) Emie expected France, in the "days to come," to take the initiative in the UN Security Council for a resolution on the current situation. He was extremely concerned about the low prospects that the United States and France would be able to reach agreement on such a resolution.It would be a "wonderful victory" for the enemies of Lebanese sovereignty if they managed to divide the United States and France over Lebanon, Emie said.FELTMAN =======================CABLE ENDS============================SUBJECT:�SINIORA CONVOKES DIPLOMATIC CORPS TO DENOUNCE ISRAELI CAMPAIGN, CALL FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT id: 72062date: 7/20/2006 16:49refid: 06BEIRUT2429origin: Embassy Beirutclassification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYdestination:header:VZCZCXRO6583PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHKUK RUEHLZDE RUEHLB #2429 2011649ZNR UUUUU ZZHP 201649Z JUL 06FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUTTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4717INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVERUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVERUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0652RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FLRHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC----------------- header ends ----------------UNCLAS BEIRUT 002429 SIPDIS SENSITIVESIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: N/ATAGS: PREL, MOPS, EAID, PTER, PREF, LE, ISSUBJECT: TFLE01: SINIORA CONVOKES DIPLOMATIC CORPS TODENOUNCE ISRAELI CAMPAIGN, CALL FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT SUMMARY------- 1. (U) In a terse but emotionally-tinged 7/19 address to the diplomatic corps, Prime Minister Siniora demanded an immediate end to hostilities between Hizballah and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), a lifting of the Israeli naval blockade, and delivery of urgently-needed humanitarianassistance. He blamed Israeli retaliatory attacks for having inflicted "immeasurable" losses, and called for a redoubling of the international commitment to Lebanon. End summary. CABINET -- MINUS HIZBALLAH MEMBER -- IN ATTENDANCE--------------------------------------------- ----- 2. (SBU) Prime Minister Siniora convoked all chiefs of mission of the diplomatic corps to the Grand Serail on the evening of July 19. Siniora arrived, once chiefs of mission and others were assembled, accompanied by nearly the entire Cabinet. A noticeable exception was Mohammad Fneish, the minister of power and water resources and the Cabinet's sole card-carrying member of Hizballah. Trad Hamadeh, the minister of labor and the Cabinet's non-card-carrying Hizballah supporter, was present. CEASE FIRE, LIFT BLOCKADE, DELIVER ASSISTANCE--------------------------------------------- 3. (U) Siniora read a prepared address to the chiefs of mission, in which he called for an immediate cease-fire between Hizballah and the IDF, the lifting of Israel's blockade of the Lebanese coast, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those parts of Lebanon, "my war ravaged country," affected by current conflict. (Note: Post has e-mailed the text to NEA/ELA-Lebanon desk and Task Force One). ADDING UP THE COSTS SO FAR-------------------------- 4. (U) The past week of conflict had led to "immeasurable" losses in Lebanon, Siniora said. Some 300 people had been killed, and 1,000 more had been injured. By his estimate, more than 500,000 people had been internally displaced. The problem was further compounded by overwhelmed hospitals and dwindling supplies of food and medicine, he said.� 5. (U) Siniora also called attention to the shelling of facilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), the Joint Security Force (an amalgam of the LAF and gendarmerie charged with patrolling southern Lebanon), the civil defense, and the UN. "The country has been torn to shreds," he said. "Can the international community stand by while such callous retribution by the State of Israel is inflicted on us?" 6. (U) Regarding Israeli attacks, Siniora asked, rhetorically, "Is this what the international community calls self defense? Is this the price we pay for aspiring to build our democratic institutions? Is this the message to send to the country of diversity, freedom and tolerance?" CALL FOR REDOUBLED COMMITTMENT TO LEBANON----------------------------------------- 7. (U) Referring to the international support shown for Lebanese sovereignty after the February 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, Siniora asked (and repeated for emphasis), "You want to support the government of Lebanon?" "No government can survive on the ruins of a nation," he added. 8. (U) Siniora concluded by telling the assembled diplomats, "I hope you will not let us down." The event, having lasted less than a quarter of an hour, then concluded.FELTMAN =======================CABLE ENDS============================SUBJECT:�PM SINIORA UPBEAT ON CEASE-FIRE POSSIBILITIES id: 73014date: 7/29/2006 6:58refid: 06BEIRUT2489origin: Embassy Beirutclassification: CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORNdestination:header:VZCZCXRO5328OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUKDE RUEHLB #2489/01 2100658ZNY CCCCC ZZHO 290658Z JUL 06 ZDK ALL CTG NUMEROUS SVCSFM AMEMBASSY BEIRUTTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4814INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITYRHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY----------------- header ends ----------------C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002489 SIPDIS NOFORNSIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2016TAGS: IS, LE, MOPS, PGOV, PREL, PTER, SYSUBJECT: TFLE01: PM SINIORA UPBEAT ON CEASE-FIREPOSSIBILITIES BEIRUT 00002489 001.3 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b). SUMMARY------- 1. (C/NF) In a July 28 meeting with the Ambassador, PM Fouad Siniora was in buoyant spirits following what he saw as a major political victory in last night's (July 27) meeting of the Council of Ministers. Siniora said after several hours of tense argument, he finally told the Council that either they support his 7-point approach to cease-fire negotiations, or he would stop negotiations. By a unanimous vote, the Ministers -- including those allied with Hizballah -- voted to fully support Siniora. Concerning potentialroadblocks with the Israelis, Siniora said he realized his approach regarding the "UN International Force" (which as written appears to be merely a strengthened UNIFIL) was a long way from GOI's position, but he insisted that he had "gone to the brink." Siniora maintained that sufficient leeway existed in his 7-point language for the UN Security Council to create a capable stabilization force with an effective mandate, but he could not explicitly spell it out prior to a cease-fire understanding. He also understood the GOI would have difficulty with the stipulation that the international force would be restricted to south Lebanon -- and therefore unable to prevent the resupply of weaponry from Syria. But again, the Prime Minister maintained that at this stage of discussions, it was as far as he could go withoutsplitting his government. End summary. 2. (SBU) The meeting on July 28 with the Ambassador and poloff took place against a backdrop of other political developments in Lebanon. Speaker Nabih Berri, who on July 27 ruled out any international force, backtracked and stressed in an interview on Al Jezeera that PM Siniora, as head of government, represented all Lebanese and he fully supported the approach the Prime Minister was taking in his discussions. Meanwhile, Hizballah MP Hassan Fadlallah reportedly told LBC television that Hizballah did not object to the government's authority throughout Lebanon. A KEY POLITICAL VICTORY----------------------- 3. (C/NF) PM Siniora recounted that Thursday evening's Cabinet meeting was long, difficult, but ultimately rewarding, both in immediate terms and possibly, for longer timeframe objectives. Siniora said winning unanimous authorization to negotiate on the basis of his Rome statement required him to go to the edge -- and implied that it had been a close call. But with the successful Cabinet vote in his pocket, he can now enter into serious discussions on the final form of the cease-fire. More than that, Siniora stated that the cease-fire was now within reach, and would be durable and comprehensive. 4. (C/NF) The Prime Minster went through the 7 points he presented in Rome. He admitted the first paragraph, which proposed an "undertaking" to release prisoners on both sides through the offices of the ICRC, was not a breakthrough and most likely unacceptable in any form to Israel, but he feltthat Hizballah was becoming more pliant on the matter. He believed the second point, the return of the IDF behind the Blue Line, was almost a given and should not prove difficult for the GOI to accept. Similarly, he did not believe the landmine maps were a problem. 5. (C/NF) Siniora said he understood the complications of the third point, dealing with the transfer of Shebaa Farms to UN jurisdiction until border delineation and Lebanese sovereignty were settled, particularly due to the fact that the UN still regarded Shebaa as Syrian territory. Siniora also recognized that the GOI did not want to concede the one issue that Hizballah had since 2000 used as one of its mainreasons to exist. But Siniora said that by initially transferring Shebaa to UN jurisdiction, it was puttingdistance between the lightning rod issue and Hizballah. Siniora underscored that assembling a successful package requires something on Shebaa Farms. 6. (C/NF) The criticality of the fourth point ? the government's authority over all of Lebanon as exercisedthrough its own "legitimate armed forces" -- was emphasized. Siniora said he hoped GOI would recognize that this was the key to its own security, in that it would force Hizballah from its sanctuary and base. And he pointed out that its implementation on the basis of Ta'if made it far more likely to succeed. Responding to the Ambassador's expressions of skepticism about the GOL's abilities, he acknowledged the LAF was presently not capable of extending its control over the south by itself, but with the deployment of the UN international force (fifth point) at the time of the cease-fire, the constitutional responsibility of the LAF could be accomplished in phases. Siniora noted that hislanguage was preferable to any formula by which only a "buffer zone" was created in southern Lebanon, as his language was applicable across the whole country. 7. (C/NF) Siniora realized the phrasing of his statement regarding the UN international force would be unacceptable to GOI in two ways: its limited operating area, and the connotation that the Government of Lebanon was simply proposing a UNIFIL on steroids. To counter this argument, the Prime Minister noted that his statement included the words "...supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment,mandate, and scope of operation." Siniora maintained that such wording would allow the UN Security Council to basically completely overhaul the peacekeeping force and authorize it to be fully capable of carrying out its objectives of security, stabilization, and reconstruction. "You have to understand," Siniora said, "I'm going as far as I possibly can." 8. (C/NF) Siniora informed the Ambassador that at this point "he could offer no more." He stated that Hizballah, through its intermediaries (Nabih Berri and the government's Shia Ministers) kept asking what his language meant, but he expressed confidence that once the Security Council created the force, Hizballah would have make the crucial choice: accept its deployment or reveal itself for what it is. 9. (C/NF) According to Siniora, the sixth point dealing with mutual acceptance of the Armistice Agreement of 1949 should pose no serious problem to GOI, but said he did realize its lack of clarity on a full resolution of bi-lateral relations was less than optimum. But here the Prime Minister emphasized that the cease-fire must not be seen as leading to a full peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel. "We simply are not there yet," he remarked, but he did state his belief that the cease-fire could open many regional opportunities. As he has before, he urged that the Armistice Agreement be used as the "destination point." 10. (C/NF) Concerning his final point on international assistance to help rebuild Lebanon, he said its inclusion was very important in that reconstruction would help restore stability and reduce confessional tensions. COMMENT------- 11. (C/NF) Prime Minister Siniora was noticeably more positive that at any time since hostilities began on July 12. The Prime Minister acted like he sees the end in sight and believes his Rome statement -- and the success at finally achieving consensus in his motley Council of Ministers -- provides the basis for a just and durable solution. He is anticipating his next meeting with SecState and is hopeful that GOI sees what he believes is the key to its own security. End comment.FELTMAN =======================CABLE ENDS============================SUBJECT: SINIORA BELIEVES HE HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF HIS PEOPLE, THE SUPPORT OF HIS CABINET, AND THE COMMITMENT OF THE FRENCH id: 73250date: 8/1/2006 7:01refid: 06BEIRUT2504origin: Embassy Beirutclassification: CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORNdestination: 06BEIRUT2504header:VZCZCXRO6531OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUKDE RUEHLB #2504/01 2130701ZNY CCCCC ZZHO 010701Z AUG 06 ZDKFM AMEMBASSY BEIRUTTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4843INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITYRHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY----------------- header ends ----------------C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002504 SIPDIS NOFORNSIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2016TAGS: IS, LE, MOPS, PGOV, PREL, PTER, SYSUBJECT: TFLE01: SINIORA BELIEVES HE HAS THE CONFIDENCE OFHIS PEOPLE, THE SUPPORT OF HIS CABINET, AND THE COMMITMENTOF THE FRENCH Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b). SUMMARY------- 1. (C/NF) In a meeting with the Ambassador and poloff late on July 31, Prime Minister Siniora explained that his declaration to not negotiate until a cease-fire had been implemented gave him the credibility and support he needs across Lebanon's political spectrum to conclude a durable cease-fire agreement. He implied that if he had conducted diplomatic business-as-usual in the aftermath of Qana, his ability to conclude an agreement would have been destroyed. Siniora said his discussions with French FM Douste-Blazy earlier in the day had focused on the composition and deployment timing of the proposed multi-national stabilization force (which Siniora sees as a UN force), and as a result of these talks, felt reasonably confident the French would rapidly deploy 1,000 troops to serve as the nucleus for the full force. Siniora stated enthusiastically he still had the full support of his Cabinet with regard to his seven-point plan, but became somewhat annoyed when asked what his fallback position would be if GOI refused some of those points. Responding to the Ambassador's skepticism, Siniora also projected an unexplained confidence that, upon implementation of the cease-fire, he could convince Hizballah to either move north of the Litani or surrender their heavy weapons to the LAF. End summary. A WAKE UP CALL-------------- 2. (C/NF) PM Siniora described the current situation with IDF and Hizballah locked in close combat as extremely difficult, with neither side able to break free of the other.He said yesterday's attack on Qana had "opened eyes" and might actually help make progress to a durable cease-fire.Concerning his July 30 declaration to Lebanon's diplomatic corps that his Government would not negotiate until a cease-fire was called, Siniora said it had been a political imperative. If he had continued his schedule to meet with SecState, Siniora maintained, his credibility would have evaporated with the Lebanese people, and his ability to conclude any negotiation would have been mortally wounded."Yesterday, we did the right thing," he stated. 3. (C/NF) Siniora said that, intellectually, he understood the Israeli government when it states that it cannot accept a cease-fire unless a credible stabilization force is already in place. But for a multi-national force to step in right at the moment of the guns going silent, he maintained, would require a firm political solution in the form of a detailed UN Security Council resolution. Siniora said that the situation on the ground does not permit a cease-fire to be delayed. The Ambassador explained that U.S. thinking is revolving around a cease-fire at the time of the passage of a UNSC, but there must be a clear framework for a sustainable cease-fire in the UNSCR and the stabilization force must deploy as close to passage of the UNSCR as possible. 4. (C/NF) Referring to his lengthy discussions with FM Douste-Blazy, Siniora said the French are already writing the initial draft resolution. He parried the Ambassador's suggestion that his Government preface the introduction of any resolution with a letter to the Security Council requesting such action -- thereby making it more difficult for Russia and China to object. Siniora maintained it was already clear what was needed -- a detailed resolution ? and such a letter would just add another step to the process. Heestimated that a resolution with the required specificity could be ready for the Council's consideration late this week. 5. (C/NF) Pressed by the Ambassador repeatedly by phone throughout the evening about the need for a letter and for him to play a leadership role by detailing what a stabilization force would do, Siniora become increasingly annoyed. Douste-Blazy, he said, does not see a letter as a necessity. Moreover, Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki was arriving in Beirut later that evening (where he met with theFrench). Mottaki surely is coming to enlist Hizballah ministers, and perhaps Nabih Berri, to try to block astabilization force and adopt more hard-line positions in general. Thus, Siniora said, the chances of his cabinet approving a letter (which, under the limited powers Lebanon's constitution gives the PM is a necessity) are "zero." If he brings the proposed letter to the cabinet, not only will it be rejected, but there is a danger the cabinet will then break the hard-fought consensus on the "seven points." DEFENDS HIS SEVEN POINTS APPROACH--------------------------------- 6. (C/NF) With his domestically well-received Sunday statement, PM Siniora said he hoped both his Government and that of Israel could expeditiously accept the deal outlined in his seven points. When asked if thought his plan would be accepted without change, Siniora argued that if all the points were addressed and an effective multi-national force available to enforce its implementation, Israel would achieve something it had not been able to achieve for decades ? a secure and stable northern border. "They are getting what they have always wanted," he declared, implying that if Israel tried to get a better deal, the opportunity may well be lost. 7. (C/NF) The Prime Minister said both GOI and GOL were getting tied up in "details" and risked losing the main objective -- peace and security for Israel, and peace and a disarmed Hizballah for Lebanon. Siniora argued that only the Iranian and Syrian regimes benefited from bickering over the proposed cease-fire agreement and its related UNSC resolution. 8. (C/NF) When asked about his inexplicable confidence that Hizballah would either move north of the Litani with its heavy weapons, or allow itself to be disarmed by the LAF, Siniora said he wasn't certain, but his on-going communication with Hizballah through Nabih Berri and other Shia interlocutors led him to believe they were "considering" and close to such action. BELIEVES FRENCH READY TO LEAD THE FORCE--------------------------------------- 9. (C/NF) Another area where PM Siniora felt rapid progress was being made was the willingness of France to take a leading role in the multi-national stabilization force (which Siniora usually referred to as the "UN force"). Siniora said his discussions with FM Douste-Blazy have been detailed and fruitful. (Note: Both PM Siniora and his senior advisor, Ambassador Mohammad Chatta, came into the meeting straightfrom their talks with Douste-Blazy in ebullient spirits. End note.) 10. (C/NF) Siniora said he was reasonably confident the first contingent on the ground would be a 1,000 man French unit, and that these personnel would form the nucleus of the rapidly deployed stabilization force. He said getting the French commitment was one of the two primary reasons for Douste-Blazy's visit -- the other being coordination on the wording of the draft UN resolution. 11. (C/NF) Midway through the meeting, PM Siniora took a lengthy call from PM Tony Blair and when he returned, indicated the British Prime Minister was also on board with the French as the vanguard unit. He also obliquely referred to a British commitment to provide "reconnaissance" to assist with the required monitoring function of the force. "CREATING THE CONDITIONS"------------------------- 12. (C/NF) Prime Minister said he believed his Minster of Culture Tarek Mitri would capably represent the Government in the intense deliberations about to commence in New York. And he conveyed almost unnatural confidence that things were falling into place quite well. He said he had created the "conditions" that were necessary to win Lebanese support for the cease-fire agreement that treated the critical concerns of both governments. 13. (C/NF) As he has in almost every previous meeting, he re-emphasized the centrality of the Shebaa Farms issue -- characterizing it as the key with which to break Hizballah's hold on Lebanese sympathies. He then rather hastily ended the meeting with his observation that the U.S. had been "in the dock" long enough in Lebanese and Arab public opinion, and now it was time to put Iran there. That is possible with the adoption of his point on Shebaa Farms (that is, a temporary UN stewardship over the area). COMMENT------- 14. (C/NF) Our message to Siniora -- both in the meetings and in the subsequent phone calls -- was that he needs to send a letter to the UNSC defining his needs, especially in relation to a stabilization force. He was not, unfortunately, in receive mode. We will meet Marwan Hamadeh (the cabinet minister least prone to flinching) today to try to work the idea from inside the cabinet. We will also ask to see the suddenly (and curiously) inaccessible French Ambassador in an attempt to find out whether Douste-Blazy really said that a GOL letter is not necessary -- and whether the French really are, as Siniora claimed, ready to send the vanguard of a stabilization force. (The last time we saw Ambassador Emie a few days ago, he was decidedly cool on the idea and almost visibly hostile to our ideas, a saddevelopment after nearly two years of Franco-American partnership on Lebanon that achieved so much.) 15. (C/NF) Siniora, on the verge of seeing his cabinet collapse in the aftermath of the Qana incident, has now rebounded on a populist high. His 7/30 vow not to negotiate until a cease-fire is in place appealed to the beleaguered Lebanese masses (nearly a quarter of whom are now displaced,putting strains across the entire country). As even moderate Christian leaders are warning, our position is interpreted here as "immoral," as any delay in a cease-fire is seen as our acceptance of further civilian deaths and destruction. At heart a reasonable and sensible man, Siniora has not yet drunk from that from that toxic cup of know-nothing anti-Americanism that so many Arab leaders have used to maintain a grip on power. But he has discovered that being seen to stand up to American requests shores up his cabinet and popular base. We got nowhere yesterday on convincing him to send a letter, and we doubt that, after his meetings today with the Iranian Foreign Minister, he'll be any more eager to confront his cabinet with something he believes won't be acceptable to the Shia ministers.FELTMAN =======================CABLE ENDS============================

Source: http://www.tayyar.org/Tayyar/News/PoliticalNews/en-US/wikileaks-siniora-1-000983.htm

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